| | | parasite | | predator | |
|---|
| | | Mild | Virulent | Tolerant | Resistant |
|---|
parasite | Mild | 1-y | fr(1-y)+(1-fr)(1-x) | m | p* m |
| | Virulent | fr(1-x)+(1-fr)(1-y) | (1-x) | v | p* v |
predator | Tolerant | -y | -x | z | (1-fr) p *z + fr *z |
| | Resistant | - p * y | - p* x | (1-fr)*z + fr (p* z) | p* z |
- The table differs from pay-off matrix tables for classical game theory models. The table accounts for two alternative strategies each for two different types of players namely parasite and predator. The pay-off of the parasite is not only decided by other parasites but also by the predator strategy and vice-versa. Therefore the complete pay-off of a mild parasite invading a virulent population in a tolerant host population is m * [fr(1-y)+(1-fr)(1-x)]. Others to be calculated similarly.
